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Although Victorson has resolved the controversy concerning the
statute of limitations and time of accrual applicable to a remote
user in a strict products liability action, the above discussion indicates the need for further clarification as to strict products liability.
Such clarification can only be achieved by the legislature. 54 Until
such time the practitioner seeking damages for injuries due to a
defective product should plead his action alternatively on all possi55
ble theories of liability conceivably available.
ARTICLE

9-

CLAss

ACTIONS

CPLR art. 9: Legislature adopts liberal class action statute.
Article 9 of the CPLR, the new class action law, 5 6 promises to
effect substantial changes in state litigation by opening judicial
doors which heretofore have been virtually closed.5 7 The new arti54 Recently, the legislature indicated its concern with facilitating the recovery of injured
plaintiffs by making changes in related areas of the law. See note 51 and accompanying text
supra.
Another recent legislative change is the enactment of comparative negligence in New
York. CPLR 1411-13. The new law applies to causes of action accruing on or after September 1, 1975. Id. 1413. CPLR 1411 states that recovery for personal injury or property
damage shall not be barred on account of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence
is a broad term, however, and must be narrowed in its application to actions in strict
products liability. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 42; Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use,
Contributoy Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 105, 119 (1972). A strict
products liability action is subject to the following defenses: the product was being improperly used, a reasonable inspection by the user would have revealed the defect -nd its
danger, or the plaintiff with reasonable care could have avoided his injuries. See note 21
supra. A reading of the new statute and its legislative history reveals that CPLR 1411 was
intended to apply to actions based on strict products liability as well as breach of warranty
when brought to recover for personal injury or property damage. See THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE CPLR, comment (a), as
appearingin [1975] N.Y. Laws 1483 (McKinney) regarding N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 10-101
(subsequently enacted as art. 14-A of the CPLR); Memorandum from Stanley Fink to N.Y.
Assembly, reprinted in 173 N.Y.L.J. 78, Apr. 23, 1975, at 7, col. 1. For a discussion of
situations where comparative negligence should or should not be applied in strict products
liability actions, see Schwartz, Strict Liability and ComparativeNegligence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171
(1974).
55 Additionally, the practitioner should be aware that the injured consumer plaintiff
may be able to bring a cause of action in the federal district courts under the Consumer
Product Safety Act §§ 2 et seq., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973). If the defective
product is covered by the Act and the plaintiff is injured as the result of a knowing or willful
violation of a rule or order of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, he may recover
damages sustained, costs, and, at the discretion of the court, reasonable attorney fees. The
plaintiff, however, must satisfy the requisite $10,000 amount in controversy. Id. § 23, 15
U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. III, 1973), discussed in Note, The Consumer Product Safety Act: A Federal
Commitment to Product Safety, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 126, 150-52 (1973).
56 Ch. 207, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 313 (McKinney), as amended, ch. 474, § 1, [1975] N.Y.
Laws57713
class action billtext
wasinfra.
signed by the Governor on June 17, 1975.
See (McKinney).
notes 61-63 The
and accompanying
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cle 9 was enacted in order to infuse the pertinent law with a
measure of practical flexibility and to accommodate pressing needs
for an effective yet "balanced group remedy in vital areas of social
concern."5 8 Towards this end, the legislation has two basic goals:
1. to set up a flexible, functional scheme whereby class actions
could qualify without the present undesirable and socially detrimental restrictions; and
2. to prescribe basic guidelines for judicial management of class
actions. 59

The most significant aspect of article 9 is that it casts the
prerequisites for a class action suit in pragmatic and functional
terms, 60 whereas the prior law determined class action status based
primarily upon the substantive rights involved. 6 1 Thus, gone is the
62
antiquated requirement of a "unity of interest, ' an amorphous
" Memorandum by Assemblyman Stanley Fink in Support of N.Y.S. 1309-B, N.Y.A.
1252-B, at 1, 198th Sess. (1975), on file in St. John's Law Review Office [hereinafter cited as
Fink]; See also TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE
ON THE CPLR, as appearing in [1974] N.Y. Laws 1797-1803 (McKinney) [hereinafter cited as
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT].

For a general discussion of the nature of the class action suit see Kalven & Rosenfield,
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941); Weinstein, Revision of
Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 433 (1960).
'9
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT,
6

supra note 58, comment at 1797.

comment at 1799; Fink, supra note 58, at 2.
61Article 9 repealed CPLR §-1005, ch. 318, § 4, [1962] N.Y. Laws 2086, which provided
in pertinent part:
Where the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons or
where the persons who might be made parties are very numerous and it may be
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for
the benefit of all.
As interpreted by the courts,
[n]either the procedural needs of the members of the class nor the inconvenience to
the courts where many separate suits are combined were, alone, sufficient bases for
a class action. . . .The courts required, in addition, an ill-defined and flexibly
applied connection between the substantive rights of members of the class.
1005.02, at 10-59.
2 WK&M
" In the leading case of Society Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, 281
N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939), two depositors attempted to institute a class action to
compel repayment of deposits by the defendant bank, alleging that the bank was not
authorized to receive deposits. The Court of Appeals, in denying class status, enunciated the
subsequently oft-quoted doctrine that "[s]eparate wrongs to separate persons, though committed by similar means and even pursuant to a single plan, do not alone create a common
or general interest in those who were wronged." Id. at 292, 22 N.E.2d at 377. The Court
added that "[1]audable desire to avoid multiplicity of actions by persons who have suffered
wrong is insufficient unless those who would bring such actions are in some manner united
in interest." Id. at 294, 22 N.E.2d at 377. As the Judicial Council noted, the Court reaffirmed
this concept in subsequent cases.
The New York courts seem to be satisfied that there is the requisite tie of interest
among the members of the group when the right asserted by or against the class is
joint or common, or when the subject matter ot the controversy is a limited fund or
specific property which is affected by the claims or defenses asserted in the action,
0Id.,
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concept which continuously plagued the New York courts, 63 and in
its place are substituted functional criteria reflecting modern societal
needs.
The new class action law may be profitably compared to its
federal counterpart, rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 4 Comparisons between the two procedural schemes are
helpful, for the New York law has in many respects improved upon
65
its precursor.
Section 901 of the new law contains a unitary scheme of prerequisites for class actions. 66 These prerequisites are as follows:
or when the relief' sought is common to all in the sense that satisfaction of the
individual claims of the parties before the court will also satisfy the claims of all
others ...
However, when there is no limited fund and the rights are several and separate
relief is sought the remedy is not available even though the basic issues of law or
fact around which the controversy revolves are common to all.
18 JUD. COUNCIL REP. 230-31 (1952) (footnotes omitted).

63 In Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d
281 (1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 500, 516-17 (1971), the
Court of Appeals acknowledged that there has been inconsistency in its decisions. 26 N.Y.2d
at 401, 259 N.E.2d at 721, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 283. Yet the Court proceeded to reaffirm "the
existing New York rule" by denying class status in the case at bar. Id. at 404, 259 N.E.2d at
723, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 286. Accord, Onofrio v. Playboy Club, 15 N.Y.2d 740, 205 N.E.2d 308,
257 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1965); Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256
N.Y.S.2d 584 (1965); Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890
(1937).
In Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 N.Y.2d 304, 307 N.E.2d 554, 352 N.Y.S.2d
433 (1973), the Court stated that "[tihe restrictive interpretation in the past of CPLR 1005
... no longer has the viability it may once have had." 33 N.Y.2d at 313, 307 N.E.2d at 558,
352 N.Y.S.2d at 439. Nevertheless, the Court denied class status once again, noting a
preference for legislative rather than judicial change in the law. Id. at 313, 307 N.E.2d at
558, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
The overall confusion resulted in a situation where "class actions were not permitted
where they should have been and were allowed where they should not have been." 2 WK&M
1005.02, at 10-60. That a class lacked the required common interest was a conclusion more
often felt than articulated by the courts. 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 1005, commentary at
92 (Supp. 1975).
For a discussion of class actions in New York see Homburger, State Class Actions and the
FederalRule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 612-21 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Homburger]; Note,
Class Actions in Vew York: Richards v. Kaskel, 38 ALBANY L. REv. 865 (1974); Comment,
Statutory Construction as as [sic] Means of Constriction, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1108 (1974).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The amended rule 23 was adopted by Order of the Supreme
Court on February 28, 1966, 383 U.S. 1031 (1966). For a discussion of the federal rule see
Homburger, supra note 63, at 629-5 1; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375-400 (1967).
It is interesting to note that amended rule 23 was patterned after the original proposed
draft of article 9 recommended by the Judicial Council. See 18 JUD. COUNCIL REP. 221-49
(1952). See also Fink, supra note 58, at 1; Homburger, supra note 63, at 631.
u In discussing article 9, reference will be made where applicable to judicial interpretations of rule 23.
1; To compare the prerequisites under the federal rule, see FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a).
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1. the class is so numerous 67 thatjoinder of all members,
whether
69
68
otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which
predominate ' over any questions affecting only individual mem71
bers;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical
72
of the claims or defenses of the class;
4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class;7 3 and
67 "The raison d'&re of the class suit doctrine is necessity, which in turn depends upon

the question of number." 3B J.

MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

23.05, at 23-271 (2d ed. 1975)

[hereinafter cited as MOORE]. The "numerosity" requirement must be interpreted on the
particular facts of each case. Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968); Davy v.
Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (per curiam); 2 H. KOOMAN, FEDERAL
CIVIL PRACTICE § 23.04, at 498 (1969); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1762, at 592 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. Indeed,
the federal courts have grappled with this requirement. Compare Lindsay v. Kissinger, 367 F.
Supp. 949, 951 (D.D.C. 1973) (mem.) (10 members enough) with Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F.
Supp. 453, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (class of 25 too small).
68 This phrase regarding joinder is not to be found in FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(1) and was
included "[t]o erase all doubt that class actions are not limited to compulsory joinder
situations .... Homburger, supra note 63, at 654.
69"Impracticable" does not mean impossible, but refers to the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all class members. Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d
909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1964); Advertising Specialty Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108, 119 (1st
Cir. 1956); MOORE, supra note 67, at 23-280; WRIGHr & MILLER, supra note 67, at 593-94.
70 Under article 9, "predominance" is a prerequisite for all class actions. This differs
from the federal rule, the latter requiring "predominance" only in a rule 23(b)(3) action. See
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b); note 75 and accompanying text infra.
7t "The fundamental question is whether the group aspiring to class status is seeking to
remedy a common legal grievance." MOORE, supra note 67, 23.45[2], at 23-756. At least one
court has required a common nucleus of operative facts affecting the entire class. See Siegel
v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (mem.), petitionfor mandamus
granted sub nom. Chicken Delight, Inc. v. Harris, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
Other courts have looked for an essential common factual link between the class members
and the defendant. See, e.g., DiCostanzo v. Chrysler Corp., 57 F.R.D. 495, 498 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (mem.). See generally Kohn, Guidance Sought on Class Action Rule, 173 N.Y.L.J. 101, May
27, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
12 One commentator has questioned whether requiring that the representative have
claims or defenses typical of those of the class is necessary in light of the other prerequisites.
See MOORE, supra note 67, 23.06-2, at 23-325. Others express doubt as to the meaning of
this requirement. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 67, § 1764, at 611. At times, the
difficulty in understanding this requirement may have led the opponent of a class to concede
it. See, e.g., Zeigler v. Gibralter Life Ins. Co. of America, 43 F.R.D. 169, 172 (D.S.D. 1967)
(mem.).
" The interests of the representative parties cannot be antagonistic to or in conflict with
the interests of the class. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940); Schy v. Susquehanna
Corp., 419 F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Mersay v. First
Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The court must consider,
inter alia, whether the interest of the representative party is coextensive with the interests of
the other members of the class, the proportion of those made parties to the total class
membership, and any other factors relating to the ability of the named parties to speak for
the rest of the class. MOORE, supra note 67, 23.07[1], at 23-352 to -353. Another essential
ingredient is that the attorney for the representatives be qualified, experienced, and able to
conduct the suit. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 67, § 1766, at 632-33. But see Becker, Introduction: Use, and Abuse of Class
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5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 4

As enacted, article 9 appears to provide a more viable mechanism
for the institution of class action suits than the more complex
federal rule. The article, in essence, adopts the broad prerequisites
of a rule 23(b)(3) action as its criteria for all class actions.7
Once the prerequisites are established, the new article mandates a threshold determination and order by the court as to
whether the suit should proceed as a class action. 76 An order
77
granting a class action must contain a description of the class.
Actions Under Amended Rule 23, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 991, 995-96 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Becker], discussing the problem of attorneys competing to represent the class.
Some courts have held this "representative" requirement crucial so as not to deprive
absent class members of due process, e.g., Dierks v. Thompson, 414 F.2d 453, 456 (Ist Cir.

1969).

74 The prerequisite that a class action be superior to other means of adjudication is
limited in the federal rule to the so-called (b)(3) action. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3). Under
article 9, however, this requirement is applicable to all class actions.
The question is whether the class action format "can serve its appropriate function
satisfactorily, in the particular situation." MOORE, supra note 67,
23.45[3], at 23-801
(footnote omitted). The court must consider whether it will be profitable for the court and
the parties to develop workable methods in conducting a class action and whether a class
action would be just, not merely convenient. Id. at 23-801 to -802. This criterion tests
whether, by virtue of a class action, economies of time, effort, and expense may be secured
while promoting a uniformity of decisions as to persons similarly situated. Id. at 23-811. It
has been suggested that one alternative to a class action is "test case." See Advisory Committee's Notes, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, as reported in 39 F.R.D. 73, 103.
Some commentators have implied yet another prerequisite, namely, that a class, in fact,
exists. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 67, § 1760, at 579. However, "[t]he class does
not have to be so ascertainable that every potential member can be identified at the
commencement of the action." Id. at 580, citing Gatling v. Buder, 52 F.R.D. 389, 392 (D.
Conn. 1971).
The last consideration under § 901 is the prohibition contained in § 901(b). There, class
status is denied when the action is brought under a statute imposing a minimum recovery or
a penalty unless the statute specifically authorizes a class action.
75Article 9, with two variations has embraced the prerequisites of the federal rule. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Under the New York rule, common questions of law or fact must
"predominate," see note 70 and accompanying text supra, and a dass action must be
"superior" to other methods of adjudication. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
Under the federal rule these prerequisites apply only in a rule 23(b)(3) action. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
76 CPLR 902. See TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, comment at 1799-1800;
Special Comm. on Consumer Affairs, N.Y.C.B. Ass'n, Report on the Proposed Class Action
Legislation in New York, at 6, on file in the St. John's Law Review Office [hereinafter cited
as Special Comm. Report].
" CPLR 903. This section also gives the court discretionary power to direct that class
members be notified of their right to beexcluded from the suit. It has been suggested that
the court will exercise this power when representation of the entire class is not needed for
disposition of the suit, when class members have a significant interest in individually controlling the action, and when such individual notice is feasible without imposing a severe
financial or administrative burden on the parties. TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58,
comment at 1800.
Opponents of the statute believe that the "opt-out" provision will allow the attorney for
the class to include anyone he chooses in the class without their consent, forcing such
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The court must consider, inter alia, the interests of class members
in separate litigation, the impracticality or inefficiency of conducting separate actions, the pendency of any other litigation as to the
instant controversy, the appropriateness of the particular forum,
and any managerial difficulties likely to be encountered in a class
action.7 8 A determination of class status by the court may be conditional and may be varied at any time before reaching a decision on
the merits.7 9
The notice provisions of section 904 signal a departure from
the federal rule.8 0 Notice, its content subject to court approval,"'
must be provided in such manner as the court directs, but need not
be given where the action is primarily for injunctive or declaratory
relief.8 2 Additionally, section 904 requires the plaintiff to bear the
individuals into affirmative action in order to request exclusion. Memorandum by The New
York State Council of Retail Merchants, Inc. in Opposition to N.Y.S. 1252, at 2, 198th Sess.
(1975), on file in St. John's Law Review Office [hereinafter cited as Retail Merchants]. See also
Manual for Complex Litigation, quoted in Becker, supra note 73, at 993-94. In addition,
opponents have contended that this feature will result in a large amorphous class, making
for unmanageable class actions. Retail Merchants, supra, at 57. But see Special Comm. Report,
supra note 76, at 8, arguing that requiring class members to express affirmative interest in
participating, i.e. an "opt-in" provision, as opponents have suggested, would undermine the
purpose of the class action, viz "to resolve the entire dispute in a single adjudication." Id.
78 CPLR 902. As the commentators noted, this list is not exhaustive. For example, the
court may also consider the apparent merits of the claims asserted. TWELFTH ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 58, comment at 1800. See also Special Comm. Report, supra note 76, at 6.
79 CPLR 902.
80 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). The federal rule contains a notice scheme which is
partially mandatory and partially discretionary. TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58,

comment at 1800.
81 Control over content is necessary to prevent transmission of improper or misleading
information. TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, comment at 1801. The problem of
unauthorized communications has plagued the federal rule. See Becker, supra note 73, at
996.
52 The Judicial Conference recommended that dispensation be granted sparingly,
such
as

where notice would be burdensome and costly, the interests of the individual
member of the class in controlling the litigation minimal, and effective representation of the class interests attainable without notification.
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, comment at 1801. But see Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974) (emphasis added), wherein the Supreme Court, relying
on a literal interpretation of rule 23(b)(3), which specifies individual notice, declared that
"notice must be provided to those . . . identifiable through reasonable effort." Although
article 9 provides for a discretionary notice scheme apparently placing the new law outside
of the narrow holding in Eisen, it has been suggested that Eisen represents a constitutional
due process standard requiring notice in every case. See Section of Litigation, ABA, Class
Actions: In the Wake of Eisen III, at 20 (July 1975), on file in St. John's Law Review Office.
Section 904 also requires the court, in determining the method by which notice is to be
given, to consider the cost of each method considered, the financial resources of the parties,
and the stake of each class member along with the likelihood that members would want to
"opt-out" or appear individually. This last factor may be determined by sending notice to a
random sample of the class. See also Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class
Actions, in 58 F.R.D. 299, 302 [hereinafter cited as Weinstein], which suggested that radio
and television, in addition to direct mailing, might be used to provide notice.
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cost of notification to the class, although the court may, at its
83
discretion, reallocate the expense.
Pursuant to section 905, the judgment, whether or not favorable, embraces the entire class. Whether a nonappearing member is
bound by an adverse judgment, however, may only be determined
84
in a subsequent action.
Section 906 adopts the federal practice of permitting a class
action as to particular issues, allowing the court discretion to carve
out subclasses when appropriate.8 5
Guidelines to assist the court in the management of the suit are
set out in section 907.86 In contrast to the federal rule, the court
81 7
may exercise discretion in imposing conditions on "intervenors.
Additionally, the court has discretion to set the terms for payment
of a judgment to a victorious class in accordance with the financial
88
condition of the defendant.
Section 908 proscribes dismissal, discontinuance, or compromise of a class action without court approval accompanied by aps1Reallocation of the expense must be considered in light of competing policies: protecting the opponent of a class from harassment, on the one hand, and the accessibility of the
courts to claimants, on the other. TWELFrH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, comment at
1801. Factors bearing on the court's discretionary use of reallocation include the merit of the

claims of the class, the respective financial status of both parties, the interest of the opponent
in obtaining a binding adjudication, and the availability of a less expensive means of notice to
the opponent of the class. Id. But see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 177 (1974),
wherein the Supreme Court held that the "petitioner must bear the cost of notice to the
members of his class" in a rule 23(b)(3) action. See also Becker, supra note 73, at 994-95;
Retail Merchants, supra note 77, at 3, which contended that lack of standards in the area of
notice leaves the court with too much unguided discretion, creating uncertainty for both
parties.
Section 904 also gives the court flexibility to allow the prevailing party to deduct as
taxable disbursements the expenses of notification.
4
TWELFtH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, comment at 1801. See also Becker, supra
note 73, at 996-97 (discussion of determining damages for the individuals in a successful
class); Weinstein, supra note 82, at 303 (discussion of awarding damages to the successful

class).
8
5Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Conflicts of interests between groups within a general
class, a recurring problem under the federal rule, are ordinarily resolved at a preliminary
hearing by a determination that the class be divided into subclasses. Becker, supra note 73, at
996.
86Section 907 attempts to give the court a blueprint for the management of class
actions. It alerts the court to its special role in class action litigation. Fink, supra note 58, at
2-3.
87CPLR 907(3). For example, the court could require that any represented party
seeking to intervene request judicial authorization to enter an appearance. TWELFTH ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 58, comment at 1802. The federal rule gives all represented parties the
right to enter an appearance. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d); Fink, supra note 58, at 2.
IsThis provision allowing the court to consider the financial condition of the defendant
when setting the judgment was designed to avoid the harsh economic results which could
befall a defendant company. See Fink, supra note 58, at 3.
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propriate notice to all class members in such manner as the court
directs.8 9
Section 909 leaves room for experimentation by allowing the
court in its discretion to assess attorneys' fees, based on the reasonable value of legal services rendered, against the opponent of a
successful class. For public policy reasons, however, no reciprocal
provision allowing the court to assess attorneys' fees against a losing
class is included. 90
In sum, the new class action law portends significant change in
state litigation. Under the prior law, 9 1 with its restrictive judicial
interpretation, 92 group claimants were often denied access to the
courts. Now, claims involving environmental offenses, consumer
interests, civil rights, adhesion contracts, and other collective activities may be championed in class form. 3
The advantages of a class action are tripartite: economic, procedural, and psychological. 94 The latter is borne of the strength
which comes with numbers. For "[e]ven if the court is not impressed, a favorable public or political reaction may be impor96
tant. '95 The disadvantages focus around the potential for abuse.
An active judiciary, exercising its discretion 97 sagaciously in fashioning decisional guidelines, can obviate such potential.
ARTICLE 14-A - DAMAGE ACTIONS: EFFECT OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK

CPLR art. 14-A:

Legislature enacts comparative negligence statute.

The legislature has enacted a "comparative negligence" statthus abandoning the traditional rule of tort law that any

ute,9 8

89 Section 908 is virtually identical to its federal counterpart. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
For a discussion of the problems likely to be encountered were settlements allowed without
court approval, see Becker, supra note 73, at 997.
90 See Homburger, supra note 63, at 654. Class actions often are in the nature of "private
attorney general" suits. The public is interested in aiding those who represent economically
or socially disadvantaged groups. Id. See also Special Comm. Report, supra note 76, at 10. For
a discussion of the problems encountered by awarding attorneys' fees, see 7B MCKINNEY'S
CPLR 909, commentary at 71-72 (Supp. 1975), and Becker, supra note 73 at 997.
91 CPLR 1005, ch. 318, § 4, [1962] N.Y. Laws 2086.
92
See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
"' See Fink, supra note 58, at 1.
942 WK&M
1005.06, at 10-64.
95
Id. at 10-66.
96 See generally Weinstein, supra note 82; Retail Merchants, supra note 77; Becker, supra
note 73.
97 The new article, leaving much to the discretion of the court, places great reliance
upon a strong and active judiciary. See Homburger, supra note 63, at 657. For a discussion of
the various hardships a class action places upon the courts, see Weinstein, supra note 82, at
300-02.
98 Ch. 69, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 94 (McKinney). A comparative negligence statute had

